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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a legal malpractice action by St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center

against Defendants Thomas Luciani and his law firm Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S.
(collectively "Luciani" or "Defendants"). Luciani represented Magic Valley Regional Medical
Center ("Magic Valley"), Plaintiff's predecessor, in a wrongful termination and False Claims Act
action alleging fraudulent Medicare billing brought against it in 2003 (the "Suter litigation"). In
March 2006, after Luciani failed timely to retain a defense expert and otherwise mishandled the
litigation, exposing Magic Valley to the risk of an $18 million adverse judgment, Magic Valley
replaced Luciani as counsel. The Suter litigation continued for approximately four more years
and resulted in a settlement with the Suter plaintiffs for $4.25 million and in legal and expert
defense expenses of approximately $12 million. Order Certifying Question to Idaho Supreme
Court (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2011) ("Order") at 1-2.1

In July 2006, Magic Valley sold substantially all of its assets and liabilities to St. Luke's
Magic VaUey Regional Medical Center ("St. Luke's" or "St. Luke's Magic Valley"), the plaintiff
in this action. Among the assets transferred by Magic Valley to St. Luke's were any "claims
against third parties by the Hospital ... , ... whether known or unknown, contingent or
otherwise." Order at 3. After the closing of the transaction, which was "effectively an asset and
liability transfer from Magic Valley to St. Luke's," "Magic Valley ceased to exist and the
operation and management of the medical center was taken over by St. Luke's. The Magic
I In granting the district court's certification request, this Court ordered that the district
court's certification order would constitu te the initial record on appeal, and directed the district
court to provide copies of the complaint, motion for summary judgment, and related affidavits
and briefing to the Court. The citations in this brief are to those pleadings, with the filing dates
in parentheses.
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Valley management team became the St. Luke's management team with some minor
modifications." Id. Following the closing, the Hospital continued to function in the same
facilities, with the same management and employees, the same board of directors, and the same
Medicare accreditation and state license. Thus, from the standpoint of the hospital's ongoing
operations, the transaction amounted to little more than changing the name on the door by adding
the two words "St. Luke's."
It is undisputed that St. Luke's assumed Magic Valley's liability in the Suter litigation

and continued to defend the False Claims Act claim. Order at 3. Thus, it was St. Luke's, not its
predecessor Magic Valley, that incurred the legal and expert fees necessary to remedy Luciani's
malpractice; and it was St. Luke's, not Magic Valley, that ultimately paid $4.25 million to the
Suter plaintiffs to settle that litigation. In January 2008, St. Luke's brought this action against
Defendants for legal malpractice seeking to recover those fees and costs as damages. After
Defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court certified to this Court under Idaho
Appellate Rule 12.3 the question whether Idaho law allows claims for legal malpractice to be
assigned.
On the undisputed facts, this Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative
and hold that Magic Valley's assignment of its legal malpractice claim to St. Luke's Magic
Valley was effective under Idaho law. The majority of courts that have considered the specific
issue presented here hold that a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its
successor, just as Magic Valley did here. See Section A, infra. That result is consistent with
simple fairness, as an attorney should not be able to escape liability for the consequences of his
own malpractice due to the fortuity of a change in ownership of his client. See Section A(3),
infra. It is also consistent with Idaho law, which expressly authorizes the assignment of things in
action, including claims against attorneys and law firms, and recognizes that legal malpractice
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claims involve purely pecuniary interests that survive a claimant's death (and are therefore
assignable). See Section B, infra. While some states have articulated a general rule of nonassignability, the vast majority of those cases bar assignment of legal malpractice claims to
strangers to the attorney-client relationship, not to successors in interest. See Section C(2), infra.
Moreover, none of the public policy considerations that are said to support a blanket rule of nonassignability applies here. See Section C(3), infra.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
St. Luke's filed its Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional breach of fiduciary

duty, and professional malpractice against Defendants in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho. CompI. (Jan. 17,2008). St. Luke's seeks to recover by its lawsuit $4.25
million it paid in settlement in the Suter litigation; approximately $12 million in attorneys' fees it
paid to successor counsel, less approximately $9.1 million recovered from the hospital's insurers,
Truck and Travelers, and from the Suter plaintiffs through an award of sanctions; approximately
$2.7 million in fees paid to its current counsel incurred in pursuit of insurance proceeds from
Truck and Travelers; interest on those sums; and attorneys' fees and costs incurred prosecuting
the malpractice litigation. PI.' s Am. Initial Disclosures [Dec. of Christopher W. Tompkins in
Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (Jan. 14,2011) ("Tompkins Dec."), Ex. 8]; Sep. 13,2010
Thomas 1. South Report of Damages at 2, [Dec. of Gregory D. Call in Supp. of PI.' s Opp. to
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (Feb. 7, 2011) ("Call Dec."), Ex. 11]. St. Luke's is also seeking
punitive damages from Defendants, having filed a motion for leave to amend its Complaint to
add a prayer for relief for punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. That motion was
heard on May 20, 2011 in the Idaho federal district court, but the federal court has not yet ruled
on the motion.
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On March 10,2008, Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses, which
included an admission that Defendants had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's.
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Mar. 10,2008), <]1<]152,62 [Call Dec., Ex. 31].
On March 31, 2008, the action was stayed until January 4, 2010, while related litigation between
Plaintiff and Truck was resolved. In December 2010, Defendants for the first time took the
position that they did not have an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's and that their
admission in their Answer was in error, and subsequently filed a motion to amend their Answer.
The court granted Defendants' motion on May 19,2011, and Defendants filed an Amended
Answer on May 24,2011, denying that they had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's.
On January 14,2011, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, including among
the grounds for their motion the argument that St. Luke's could not maintain a legal malpractice
claim against Defendants because no attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiff and
Defendants. On February 7, 2011, St. Luke's filed its opposition brief, raising, among other
arguments, Defendants' prior admission of an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's in their
Answer; that as a successor entity St. Luke's was entitled to stand in Magic Valley's shoes for
the purposes of the attorney-client relationship; and that even if the attorney-client relationship
did not pass automatically to St. Luke's, the right to sue Defendants for malpractice was validly
assigned to St. Luke's. On February 25,2011, Defendants filed their reply brief.
On October 28,2011, the United States District Court (Hon. Edward J. Lodge) issued an
Order seeking to certify to this Court the following question of law: "Does Idaho law allow legal
malpractice claims to be assigned?" As the court explained in its order, the facts related to this
issue are "not disputed by the parties." Order at 1. In a transaction that closed on July 1, 2006,
"the assets and liabilities associated with the operation of Magic Valley" were transferred to S1.
Luke's Magic Valley. Id. at 2-3. The transaction was governed by a Sale and Lease Agreement
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under which Twin Falls County, the owner of Magic Valley, and Magic Valley trans felTed to S1.
Luke's any "claims against third parties by the Hospital ... , whether or not reflected on the
Hospital's Balance Sheet and whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise." [d. at 3.
While the Sales and Lease Agreement did not contain any specific assignment of a legal
malpractice claim against Luciani, it was undisputed that S1. Luke's was aware of the Suter
litigation and the potential financial liability associated with the litigation as well as the decision
to hire successor counsel and terminate Luciani's representation. !d. Thus, "[t]he question in
this case is whether S1. Luke's (as Luciani's former client's successor) can step into the shoes of
Magic Valley for Magic Valley's legal malpractice claim against Luciani in light of the broad
assignment language used in the Sale and Lease Agreement or are legal malpractice actions not
assignable in Idaho as a matter of law." [d. at 4.
On November 17, 2011, this Court accepted the certification of that question of law.

III.

STATEMENT OJ? FACTS
A.

St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center Is the Successor to Magic
Valley Regional Medical Center.
1.

Following A July 2006 Transaction, Magic Valley Regional Medical
Center Joined the St. Luke's Health System and Changed Its Name,
Continuing the Same Operations With the Same Personnel in the
Same Location.

Magic Valley Regional Medical Center was a county-owned hospital operating in Twin
Falls County, Idaho. In 2006, Magic Valley engaged in a transaction whereby Magic Valley
became part of the newly created S1. Luke's Health System and the hospital became known as
"S1. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center" (the "S1. Luke's Transaction"). Sale and
Lease Agreement, [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7].
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Upon the close of the St. Luke's Transaction on July 1,2006, the hospital continued to
operate as it had before under a different name. St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical
Center "employ(ed] the same personnel, occupie[d] the same land, conduct[ed] the same
business, haC d] the same address, and occupier d] the same facilities as did Magic Valley."
Groesbeck Aff. gr 5 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. Its board of directors included the members from
the board of directors of Magic Valley. ld., 7f 5. St. Luke's Magic Valley retained the same
Medicare provider number as its predecessor and was not required to reapply for accreditation.
ld., grlJ[ 6-7. St. Luke's Magic Valley was "not required to be recertified by the Bureau of Facility
Standards for the State of Idaho (the Idaho hospital licensing authority) as a result of' the St.
Luke's Transaction. ld. gr 8. St. Luke's Magic Valley "agreed to use Magic Valley Regional
Medical Center staff, space and equipment to deliver the same health services that were provided
by Magic Valley Regional Medical Center," (id. gr 3), and it has continually operated in Twin
Falls County, providing hospital services, just as its predecessor had. 2

2.

St. Luke's Magic Valley Became Magic Valley's Successor, Assuming
Its Predecessor's Contracts, Liabilities, Obligations, Property, and
Interests, Including All Claims Against Third Parties.

The terms of the St. Luke's Transaction were memorialized in the Sale and Lease
Agreement. Sale and Lease Agreement [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. As the Sale and Lease
Agreement states, St. Luke's assumed all of Magic Valley's "contracts, agreements, and leases,"
to the extent they were assignable. ld., Article II, § 2.2(b). Magic Valley also sold or assigned
all its hospital records, inventory, and grants to St. Luke's. ld. §§ 2.2(d)-(e), (g). St. Luke's

2 In 2011, St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center moved to a new facility in
Twin Falls.
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Magic Valley also received all cash, investments, and accounts receivable owned by or owed to
Magic Valley. Id. § 2.2(f).
St. Luke's Magic Valley also assumed "all debts, liabilities and obligations" of Magic
Valley, specifically including "any fines, penalties and punitive, consequential and other special
damages." Id., Article III. While certain liabilities that were "covered and paid by insurance"
were excluded from the transfer, St. Luke's Magic Valley became liable for any defense costs
and any judgment in the underlying Suter actions to the extent those costs were not already paid
for by insurance. !d.; Groesbeck Aff., <Jr 3 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72].
Articles II and III of the Sale and Lease Agreement set forth the provisions that validly
assigned the malpractice claim against Defendants to St. Luke's Magic Valley. [Tompkins Dec.,
Ex. 7]. Section 2.2(b) assigned all of Magic Valley's "contracts, agreements, and leases," and all
of their "benefits and burdens." !d. Section 2.5, entitled "Other Property," explained that with a
few specific exceptions "it is the intent of the Parties that all property and interests of the
hospital ... be leased, sold, assigned, licensed or transferred" to St. Luke's Magic Valley,
including "any claims against third parties by the Hospital and settlements received thereto,
whether or not reflected on the Hospital's Balance Sheet and whether known or unknown,
contingent or otherwise." Id. (emphasis added).
Several other operative documents were signed at the closing of the St. Luke's
Transaction to effectuate various transfers referenced in the Sale and Lease Agreement. For
example, the Bill of Sale re-stated that "all of the benefits and burdens" of the "contracts,
agreements, and leases" set forth in Article II, Section 2.2 were being assigned to St. Luke's
Magic Valley. Bill of Sale § 2(a)(ii) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 74]; Sale and Lease Agreement,
Article II, § 2.2(b) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. Execution of these additional documents in no way
negated the broad language transferring "any claims against third parties." See Sale and Lease
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Agreement, Articles II and III [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7].

B.

In the Underlying Suter Litigation, Defendants Represented Magic Valley,
but Failed to Take the Steps Necessary to Adequately Defend the Litigation.
1.

Truck "Panel" Attorney Tom Luciani Agreed To Defend The Entire
Underlying Suter Litigation Despite His Lack Of Relevant Experience.

In August of 2001, Cheri Suter and Mindy Harmer, two former employees of Magic
Valley's Transitional Care Unit ("TCU"), filed suit in Idaho state court, alleging various
employment causes of action. In January 2003, in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, Suter and Harmer filed under seal a qui tam action in the name of the United
States government, alleging Magic Valley violated the False Claims Act by sUbmitting false
claims for reimbursement to Medicare for rehabilitation services provided in the TCU. The
False Claims Act complaint was unsealed in July of 2003 after the government declined to
intervene. In March of 2003, Suter and Harmer filed an employment action in Idaho federal
court, essentially duplicating the claims in the state employment action and adding a False
Claims Act retaliation claim. The Idaho state employment action was stayed, and the federal
employment action was subsequently consolidated with the qui tam action. Collectively, these
actions are referred to as the "Suter Litigation." See Suter Litigation Compls. [Tompkins Dec.,
Exs. 9, 12, and 13].
Magic Valley's insurer Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") initially defended the Suter
litigation on behalf of Magic Valley through the firm of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, but
appointed Tom Luciani of the Washington firm of Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith
("Defendants") in July of 2003, the same month the False Claims Act complaint was unsealed.
See Luciani Dep. 24: 17-25: 16 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith was a

member of a "panel" of attorneys that Truck regularly used to defend its insureds. See Anderson
Dep., 100:24-101:4 [Call Dec., Ex. 12]. Luciani had experience in handling medical malpractice
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cases, but no experience in defending claims alleging false Medicare billing. Luciani Dep. 14:610; 15:25-16: 19 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Luciani agreed to defend the entire litigation and understood
he was responsible for defending the False Claims Act claims. Id. 28:6-29: 14.

2.

Luciani Failed Adequately To Defend the Suter Litigation,
Conducting No Substantive Legal Research On the False Claims Act
Claims and Failing to Retain an Expert Witness.

In defending Magic Valley, Luciani failed to conduct any meaningful research on the
False Claims Act claims, relying on CLE materials and a conversation with a CLE presenter.
Luciani Dep. 60:25-62: 11 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. In particular, Luciani did not research whether his
defense strategy that Magic Valley could blame co-defendant NRP for any false billings was a
valid one. !d. 59:24-60:24; 131:13-134:17.
Luciani failed to communicate with Magic Valley, sending at least five status updates to
Truck that were not also copied to Magic Valley, his client. See Status Updates Oct. 4, 2004Feb. 8, 2006 [Call Dec. <J[ 16, Exs. 15-19]. Luciani admitted to Truck in one of these letters that
the Suter litigation "is an incredibly complex case because of the nature of the allegations, the
numerous witnesses and the mind-boggling regulations that form the basis for the Medicare
suhmissions in question." See Oct. 4, 2004 Luciani Letter to Dexter, at 4 [Call Dec., Ex. 15].
Luciani also engaged in unauthorized coverage discussions with Truck. See Feb. 8,2006
Luciani letter to Johnson [Call Dec., Ex. 16].
On December 22, 2005, the Suter plaintiffs served on Luciani a report prepared by their
expert, R. Lawrence Nicholson. Report of Nicholson [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 26]. The report was
based on an audit of patient files and calculated Magic V ailey's liability for damages under the
False Claims Act at more than $18 million. Id. p. 25. Despite the magnitude of the alleged
damages, Luciani did not inform Magic Valley about the report until twelve days after the report
was submitted. Luciani's Billing Records [Tomkins Dec., Ex. 18]. Magic Valley later learned
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that its deadline for disclosing expert witnesses and expert reports, including rebuttal of the
Nicholson Report, was less than a month away. Jan. 17,2006 A. Taylor Email to Rosenbloom
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 31]. Although Luciani was aware of the fast-approaching deadline for
Magic Valley to submit its own expert reports, Luciani had not retained any expert on False
Claims Act damages or any expert who could rebut Nicholson's report. Luciani Dep. 45:21-46:8
[Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Moreover, Luciani had not even had conversations with any experts as of
January 2006 about whether Magic Valley's Medicare billing was in compliance. Id.50:8-12.

3.

Luciani's Malpractice Caused a Crisis for the Hospital, Forcing the
Hospital to Retain Substitute Counsel.

Lacking a defense, Magic Valley was in crisis. Magic Valley was at risk of an adverse
summary judgment in the amount of $18 million, a judgment so substantial that it could have
caused Magic Valley to default on its bonds, which would have been, in the words of its CFO, a
"catastrophic event financially for the hospital." Groesbeck Dep. 139:24-140:10 (Truck
litigation) [Call Dec., Ex. 21]; Barry Dep. 158:6-14 [Call Dec., Ex. 22]. Luciani himself told
Magic Valley that the Nicholson report presented serious "problems" for Magic VaHey,
including:
Rebutting the assertion that we knowingly or recklessly submitted
false claims based on the conduct of contract vendors and their
employees, in the face of allegations that we had no mechanism in
place to supervise such conduct; and
Effectively mediating in an environment where the responsible codefendant is self-insured and is not believed to have the monetary
assets required to contribute in an amount that would permit
settlement. Consequently, mediation is doomed to fail, or we will
be expected to pay an amount that grossly exceeds our individual
responsibility.
Jan. 6,2006 Luciani Letter to K. Taylor at 2-3 (emphasis added) [Call Dec., Ex. 10].

10

While there may have been weaknesses in the Nicholson Report, "there were enough
strands of a legitimate audit" that the report would not be excluded from evidence. Hayman
Dep. 33:19-35:4; 107:22-109:17 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]. Therefore, Magic Valley needed an expert
who could rebut the Nicholson Report or it would be left without a defense. Hayman Dep.
107:22-108:17 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]; Barry Dep. 158:6-159:15 [Call Dec., Ex. 22].
Its future at stake, Magic Valley sought advice from other counsel and was advised that
an audit was absolutely necessary. Magic Valley needed to retain a law firm with sufficient
resources and expertise to respond to the Nicholson Report in record time. It contacted the firm
of McDermott, Will & Emery ("McDermott"), but McDermott made clear that its "ability to
prepare and present a defense" depended on the court's willingness to extend the schedule,
stating that "[i]n light of the factual work that needs to be done by any expert, and the lack of
currently retained experts, we do not believe there is any way we would be able to appear as
counsel ... and abide by the existing case schedule." Jan. 30,2006 Engagement Letter
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 33].
Eventually, extensions were obtained and Magic Valley's expert report submitted, but
given the volume of records to be audited, the report prepared by Coding Compliance Solutions
("CCS"), the expert hired by McDermott, was not completed until over a month and one-half

after the initial rebuttal expert report deadline. Mar. 24,2006 Edford Report [Tompkins Dec.,
Ex. 45]. The report revealed no statistically significant billing errors. Id. McDermott
subsequently deposed the Suter plaintiffs' expert witness Nicholson and learned that he had lied
on his resume, resulting in his withdrawal as an expert witness. Hayman Dep. 28:22-31:20 [Call
Dec., Ex. 23]
While McDermott successfully managed the initial crisis, damage still remained from
Luciani's negligence, some of which could not be corrected. See, e.g., Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 183:2-
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187:16 [Call Dec., Ex. 14]. Luciani never filed a motion to dismiss. Id. at 183:2-21. He failed
adequately to prepare Magic Valley's witnesses for their depositions. Id. at 186:2-24. He failed
to propound written discovery relating to the False Claims Act allegations. Id. at 123:8-124:6.
He relied on co-defendant NRP to notice and lead offensive depositions. Luciani Dep. 208:23209:20 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. He "participated in" the depositions of the plaintiffs but focused on
plaintiffs' wrongful termination claims. /d. He failed to assert a statute of limitations defense to
the Suter plaintiffs' False Claims Act retaliation claim and failed to explore whether the original
source rule barred Cheri Suter's claims. Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 182:21-190:2 [Call Dec., Ex. 14].
By the time McDermott took over, fact discovery was nearly complete and Magic Valley was
stuck with the evidentiary record Luciani had allowed to be created. Jun. 6,2005 Order Granting
Second Stip. Mot. for Extension of Time [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 27]; Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 183:2-21
[Call Dec., Ex. 14].
Burdened by the lingering effects of Luciani's malpractice, in April 2010, St. Luke's
Magic Valley and the Suter plaintiffs settled their litigation for $4.25 million. The Settlement
Agreement between them contained no admission of liability by St. Luke's Magic Valley.
Settlement Agreement at 1 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 49].

4.

Defendants' Malpractice Caused Magic Valley And St. Luke's to
Incur Damages in the Form of Uninsured Attorneys' Fees And Other
Costs.

During Luciani's time as counsel for Magic Valley, Truck paid his fees for the defense of
the entire Suter litigation, including the False Claims Act claims. Luciani Dep. 79: 1780:3;104:23-105:2 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Once Luciani's negligence led to his replacement, Truck
stopped paying the defense costs for the False Claims Act portion of the Suter litigation, despite
an admitted duty to defend under the applicable insurance policy. See Truck's Mot. for Summ. J.
at 12-13 (Truck Litigation) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 6]. As a result, Magic Valley-and then St.
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Luke's Magic Valley-was forced to pay defense costs for the False Claims Act litigation out of
pocket. Groesbeck Aff. <JI:1O [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; CompI.

<JI:~[

48-52 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 1].

As a result of Luciani's negligence, Magic Valley and St. Luke's Magic Valley also had to
negotiate, and then litigate, with Truck over the payment of these Suter litigation defense costs.
Groesbeck Aff. <JI:1O [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; Truck Litigation CompI. [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 62];
Truck Litigation Answer and Counterclaims [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 63]. But for Luciani's

negligence, Magic Valley would not have needed to replace him and Truck would have
continued to pay Luciani's fees in defense of the entire Suter litigation as the insurer previously
had done. See Luciani Dep. 79: 17-80:3 [Call Dec., Ex. 8].

C.

After The St. Luke's Transaction, St. Luke's Stepped Into Magic Valley's
Shoes In The Suter Litigation and All Related Disputes.
1.

St. Luke's Continued the Defense of the Suter Litigation, Paying
Defense Costs and the Settlement.

Upon the close of the St. Luke's Transaction on July 1,2006, Magic Valley ceased to
exist. May 14, 2008 Memo. Decision and Order (Truck Litigation) at 5 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]. St.
Luke's became responsible for the Suter litigation, continuing to defend the action and pay
defense costs not paid for by insurance. Am. Initial Disclosures § C(a) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8].
This was consistent with the terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement, whereby St. Luke's Magic
Valley became liable for any defense costs and any judgment in the underlying actions to the
extent those costs were not already paid for by insurance. Sale and Lease Agreement, Article III
(Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]; Groesbeck Aff., 1[ 3 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. It was St. Luke's Magic
Valley, not its predecessor Magic Valley, that paid the Suter Litigation settlement of $4.25
million. See Am. Initial Disclosures § C(c) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8].
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2.

S1. Luke's Also Took Up the Dispute with Truck Regarding the
Payment of Litigation Defense Costs.

As noted above, Truck and Magic Valley engaged in discussions about payment of the
False Claims Act claims defense costs after Luciani's negligence led to his replacement with
McDermott. See Groesbeck Aff. 1 10 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. Truck contended that the
defense costs incurred for McDermott's services were voluntary payments by Magic Valley and
it refused payment on that basis, which Magic Valley disputed. Id. These discussions continued
throughout 2006, and St. Luke's Magic Valley continued to engage in those discussions after the
St. Luke's Transaction closed. Id.
Several months later, for the first time Truck took the position that St. Luke's Magic
Valley was not entitled to benefits under the policy because Magic Valley was the entity to
which the insurance policy had been issued. See id. 1 11; Truck Litigation First Am. CompI.,
filed Jan. 17,2007 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho for the County of
Ada, 1118-25 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 62]. However, Truck admitted that it had a duty to defend
the Suter litigation under the applicable insurance policy, and it continued to pay for a portion of
the defense costs for the non-False Claims Act claims, after Luciani's replacement, both before
and after the St. Luke's Transaction. See Truck's Mot. for Summ. 1. at 12-13 (Truck Litigation)
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 6]; Groesbeck Aff.

1~[

9, 11 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; Pl.'s Am. Initial

Disclosures 1 C(a)(ii) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8].
Ultimately, Truck's argument that St. Luke's Magic Valley was not entitled to benefits
under the insurance policy failed. The Ada County trial court ruled in the Truck Litigation that
St. Luke's Magic Valley was entitled to assert claims for breach of duty to defend and bad faith
against Magic Valley's insurer based on the valid assignment from Magic Valley, effected by the
broad terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement, even though assignment was prohibited by the
terms of the insurance policy. May 14,2008 Memo. Decision and Order [Call Dec., Ex. 32].
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3.

In the Malpractice Litigation, Defendants Initially Admitted They
Had An Attorney-Client Relationship with St. Luke's Magic Valley.

Consistent with the position taken by the Suter plaintiffs and Truck, Defendants here
initially took the position that the St. Luke's Transaction changed only the name of the entity
involved in the dispute. Defendants admitted in their Answer filed in 2008 that they had an
attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's Magic Valley, which meant that Defendants agreed
that St. Luke's Magic Valley was the proper entity to bring the malpractice claim against
Defendants. Defs.' Answer and Affirmative Defenses (March 10, 2008),

n 52, 62 [Call Dec.,

Ex.31]. It was not until two and one-half years later, in December 2010, that Defendants sought
leave to amend their Answer to withdraw their admission of an attorney-client relationship.
They filed their amended answer in May 2011.

IV.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The question certified to this Court by the

u.s. District Court for the District of Idaho is

"Does Idaho law allow legal malpractice claims to be assigned?" The issue is presented on
undisputed facts in the context of "an asset and liability transfer from Magic Valley to St.
Luke's" that included an assignment of "all claims against third parties by the Hospital ... ,
whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise." Order Certifying Question to Idaho
Supreme Court (D. Idaho Oct. 27,2011) at 2-3. Thus, as the district court phrased it, "The
question in this case is whether St. Luke's (as Luciani's former client's successor) can step into
the shoes of Magic Valley for Magic Valley'S legal malpractice claim against Luciani in light of
the broad assignment language used in the Sale and Lease Agreement or are legal malpractice
actions not assignable in Idaho as a matter of law." Id. at 4. This Court should answer the
certified question in that context, relying upon the facts stated by the certifying court and
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contained in the undisputed record. See Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792
P.2d 926, 927-28 (1990) (relying upon factual summary provided by certifying court); Toner v.
Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297,302 & n.4 (1987) (answering certified

questions in the context of the claims and contentions in the case).

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue certified to this Court by the District Court is a question of law, over which this

Court exercises free review. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884,886 (2004).

VI.

ARGUMENT

MAGIC VALLEY'S ASSIGNMENT OF ITS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS TO
ST. LUKE'S, ITS SUCCESSOR, WAS EFFECTIVE UNDER IDAHO LAW.
The substantial majority of courts to have considered the specific issue presented here
hold that a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its successor. That rule is
consistent with Idaho law, which authorizes the assignment of things in action and recognizes
that legal malpractice claims involve pecuniary loss. This Court therefore should follow the
majority approach and hold that Magic Valley's assignment to St. Luke's of its legal malpractice
claims against Luciani in the July 2006 transaction was effective under Idaho law.

A.

An Entity May Assign Legal Malpractice Claims To Its Successor.
1. The Majority Of Courts Uphold The Assignment Of Legal Malpractice
Claims By A Predecessor Entity To Its Successor.

The majority of courts to have considered the specific issue presented here, including the
high courts of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, hold that a predecessor entity may assign legal
malpractice claims to a successor entity. 4 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 26:10 at 1018
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(2011 ed.) ("The reported decisions have tended to treat a 'successor' entity as able to assert the
legal rights of the predecessor, including a pre-existing malpractice claim .... "). This Court
should follow that rule, which is consistent with Idaho law and prevents an attorney from
escaping liability for legal malpractice by the fortuity of a corporate transaction involving his or
her former client.
Thus, in Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057 (R.I. 1999), the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held as a matter of first impression in that state that "legal
malpractice claims, transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in a
commercial transaction, are assignable." Id. at 1061. The plaintiffs in Cerberus Partners were
financial institutions that had purchased loans given by a group of commercial lenders to an
entity that later filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiffs contended that defendant law firms and attorneys,
who had represented the lenders in the loan transactions, failed to perfect the lenders' security
interests in the debtor's assets, with the result that plaintiffs were unable to collect the full value
of the loans they had purchased. They brought an action for legal malpractice, and the trial court
granted summary judgment for the attorneys on the grounds that there was no attorney-client
relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and public policy precluded the assignment
of legal malpractice actions. Id. at 1058-59. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the assignment was effective. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs "did not merely
purchase the legal malpractice claim, but were instead the assignees of the Lenders' original
agreements with respect to the loans to [the debtor], and the plaintiffs acquired, along with those
loans, all of the attendant obligations and rights that went along with those loans, including but
not limited to the Lenders' legal malpractice action against the defendants." Id. at 1059. The
court found that factor distinguished the situation before it from the "great m<0ority" of cases in
other jurisdictions that had considered the issue of the assignability of legal malpractice claims,
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where "a legal malpractice claim was transferred to a person without any other rights or
obligations being transferred along with it." Id.
In Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996), the court went even farther,
holding that an assignment of legal malpractice claims in a sales transaction was effective under
District of Columbia law even though the buyer was not the seller's successor in interest. The
defendant, which had purchased certain assets and liabilities of the seller and continued the
operation of the seller's business, brought a counterclaim for legal malpractice against the
seller's attorney. The court found that because the sales contract appeared to transfer only
certain specifically enumerated assets and the defendant had entered into a covenant not to
compete with the selling entity, which suggested that it continued to exist following the
transaction, the defendant was not its legal successor for purposes of bringing preexisting claims.
Id. at 356. It nevertheless held that the seller's general assignment to the defendant of "claims

and demands" included claims for legal malpractice arising directly out of the seller's conduct,
and that District of Columbia law did not prevent the seller from assigning those claims. Id. at
357-58; accord, Learning Curve Intern., Inc. v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, 911 N.E.2d 1068, 1080-82

(Ill. App. 2009) (corporation's assignment of malpractice claim as part of transfer of assets in
merger did not violate Illinois public policy) (following Cerberus Partners and Richter);
Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1987) (assignment by client

patentee of "the entire right, title and interest in and to the patent application" and of "all rights
and causes of action" against attorney arising out of the mishandling of the patent application
was effective under Pennsylvania law);3 see also Child, Inc. v. Rodgers, 377 A.2d 374,378 (Del.
3 In Hedlund, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the assignee of a legal
malpractice claim had standing to assert the claim despite a lack of privity with the attorney,
observing that "[p]rivity is not an issue in cases involving an assigned claim because the assignee
(Continued ... )
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Super. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Pioneer Nat 'I Title Ins. Co. v. Child,

Inc., 401 A.2d 68 (Del. 1979) (foundation that adopted predecessor foundation's name and
charter succeeded to its interests and therefore had standing to maintain action for damages
against predecessor's attorney).4

2. The Assignment Is Valid, Regardless Of The Form Of The Transaction,
If The Practical Consequences Of The Transaction Resulted In Transfer
Of Control Of The Business.
As Richter illustrates, whether a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim
to a successor entity does not turn on the technical form of the transaction, such as whether it
involves a merger or a sale of assets. That is because there are "myriad ways control of a
corporation or a pOIiion of [a] corporation can change hands." Souverain Software LLC v. Gap,

Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 760, 763 (B.D. Tex. 2004). Rather, it depends on the "practical
consequences of the transaction": if the transaction results in a transfer of control of the

stands in the shoes of the assignor and does not pursue the cause of action in the assignee's own
right." 539 A.2d at 358 (citation omitted). Thus, this Court's ruling that a direct attorney-client
relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in a legal
malpractice action except in certain narrow circumstances (Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho
134,90 P.3d 884 (2004» does not resolve the issue before the Court here.
4 Other courts have reached a similar conclusion in a variety of contexts, including
assignment of claims by a corporation to shareholders or other related parties. See, e.g.,
Learning Curve Intern., Inc., 911 N.E.2d at 1080-82 (corporation validly assigned legal
malpractice claim to former shareholders, who suffered the loss due to the alleged malpractice);
Collins v. Fitzwater, 560 P.2d1074 (Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, Lancaster v. Royal Ins.
Co., 302 Or. 62 ( 1986) (corporate director assigned legal malpractice claim against corporate
attorney to purchasers of securities); Kaplan v. Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P. c., 832 So.2d
138, 140 (Fla. Dist. App. 2002), decision approved, 902 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2005) (corporation had
right to assign claim for legal malpractice arising out of preparation of private placement
memoranda to assignee for benefit of creditors).
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corporation and therefore of the attorney-client privilege,5 the successor is entitled to pursue the
predecessor entity's legal malpractice claim. Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff, Ltd.,
585 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
In Parus Holdings, the court denied defendant attorneys' motion to dismiss legal
malpractice claims brought against them arising out of their work on a patent application for a
predecessor entity. The court rejected the attorneys' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing
to bring the claims, emphasized that the patents had been assigned to it and that it took over the
division of the predecessor's business responsible for development and marketing of the patented
telephony system, including "taking on employees and managers from the division." Id. at 1003;
see also, e.g., Goodrich v. Goodrich, 960 A.2d 1275, 1285 (N.H. 2008) (following sale,
successor corporation continued to own, manage and lease corporate office building and
possessed predecessor's preexisting rights and liabilities); Tekni-Plex v. Meyner & Landis, 674
N.E.2d 663,667-69 (N.Y. 1996) (where successor corporation acquired assets of corporate
client, which ceased to exist, and "the business of [predecessor] remained unchanged, with the
same products, clients, suppliers and non-managerial personnel," control of attorney-client
privilege passed to successor corporation); Oswall v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., 691 A.2d 889, 894-95
(N.J. App. Div. 1997) ("the corporation produces the same products, under the same name in the
same facilities and inherited all of the liabilities and rights of the former corporation").
Here, as discussed in more detail above, the July 2006 transaction involved a transfer of

5 In general, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege
follows the passage of control of the corporation. Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,349 (1985) (trustee of corporation in bankruptcy has power to waive
debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege as to pre-filing communications).
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substantially all of Magic Valley's assets and liabilities to St. Luke's, including a general
assignment of "all claims against third parties by the Hospital ... , whether known or unknown,
contingent or otherwise." After the transaction closed, the hospital continued to employ the
same personnel and to conduct the same business in the same facility, under the direction of the
same board of directors, utilizing the same Medicare accreditation and state license, as it had
under the Magic Valley name. Accordingly, just as in Richter and other cases, Magic Valley's
general assignment to St. Luke's of all claims against third parties including Luciani was an
effective assignment to a business successor.

3. An Attorney Should Not Be Able To Escape Liability For Legal
Malpractice Due To The Fortuity Of A Change In Corporate Ownership.
Allowing a predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to its successor is
consistent with the consideration that an attorney should not be able to escape liability for legal
malpractice by the mere fortuity of a change in corporate ownership. As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court observed in Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa.
1987),
We will not allow the concept of the attorney-client relationship to
be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the
consequences of legal malpractice. Where the attorney has caused
harm to his or her client, there is no relationship that remains to be
protected.

Id. at 359. That consideration applies squarely here, because following the July 2006
transaction, Magic Valley was dissolved, and its assets and liabilities were transferred to St.
Luke's. St. Luke's therefore is the only surviving entity that has the ability to assert a claim
against Luciani arising out of his representation of Magic Valley. Refusing to enforce Magic
Valley's assignment of its claims would shield defendants' alleged malpractice from legal

21

scrutiny and disserve the interest in compensating a harmed client, yet would not further any of
the public policies that are said to support the rule against assignability in other contexts.
B.

Assignment Of Legal Malpractice Claims To A Successor Entity Is
Consistent With Idaho Law.

The rule that a predecessor entity may validly assign a legal malpractice claim to a
successor is consistent with Idaho law, for at least two reasons. First, Idaho law expressly
authorizes assignment of things in action, including claims against attomeys and law firms.
Second, Idaho law recognizes that legal malpractice claims are claims arising from contract,
which survive the death of a plaintiff and are therefore assignable, rather than claims for personal
injury, which do not.

1. Idaho Law Expressly Authorizes Assignment Of Things In Action.
Assignment of legal malpractice claims to a successor entity is consistent with Idaho law,
which expressly authorizes assignment of things in action. Idaho Code Section 55-402 provides:
A thing in action arising out of the violation of a right of property,
or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner. Upon the
death of the owner it passes to his personal representatives, except
where, in the cases provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it
passes to his devisees or successor in interest.
It is settled in Idaho that a cause of action, or "thing in action," may be assigned.
Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234,657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (citing I.e.
§ 55-402); Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415 (1924). As this Court has explained, equity

long ago rejected the "ancient common law" rule that things in action were not assignable
because "the act of assignment was regarded against public policy, if not illegal." Casady v.
Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415, 421 (1924). Instead, "equity has always held that the
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assignment of a thing in action, for a valuable consideration, should be enforced, and has given
effect to assignments of every kind of future and contingent interests or possibilities in real or
personal property when made upon a valuable consideration." Id.
Applying this general rule, Idaho courts have explicitly recognized that a client may
acquire assignable rights against a law firm. In Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234,
657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983), the client owed money to a creditor, Bonanza Motors, on a
delinquent promissory note. To obtain forbearance against judgment on the note, the client gave
the creditor a partial assignment of his interest in funds to be received from an action against an
insurance company in which the law firm had represented him and obtained a favorable
judgment. The assignment instrument directed the law firm to pay the creditor directly when the
funds were received, but it failed to do so. The creditor sued on the assignment and obtained
summary judgment against the law firm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
in favor of the creditor, rejecting the law firm's claim that its obligation to the client did not give
rise to an assignable right. The court viewed the assignment as embracing two elements: the
client's underlying right to recover from the insurance company, and the client's right to
disbursement of the proceeds by the law firm when proceeds of the action were received. Id. at
1103. Regarding the first, the court recognized that it is settled in Idaho that a cause of action

may be assigned. Regarding the second, "it appears to be well established that an attorney-client
relationship generally imposes upon the law firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an
agent or trustee, to account for funds received in the course of legal representation and to pay the
client any sums to which he may be entitled." Id. at 1104. The court concluded that the law firm
owed the client an obligation which gave rise to an assignable right. Id.
While Bonanza Motors did not involve assignment of a legal malpractice claim, but
rather of other contractual rights, it nevertheless makes clear that the general rule that things in
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action may be assigned applies equally to claims against law firms. There is no principled basis
for distinguishing that situation from the one presented here, where Luciani owed Magic Valley
contractual duties which similarly gave rise to assignable rights.

2. Under Idaho Law, Legal Malpractice Claims Survive The Death Of A
Plaintiff, And Therefore Are Assignable.
The rule that a legal malpractice claim may be assigned to a successor entity is also
consistent with Idaho law regarding the survival of claims. Under the common law rule, claims
based in contract survive the death of the plaintiff, while claims in tort do not. Legal malpractice
actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories, and therefore survive a former client's
death. Because survivability and assignability are closely related, it follows that legal
malpractice claims may also be assigned.
At common law, claims arising out of contracts (claims ex contractu) generally survive
the death of the claimant, while those which sound in pure tort (claims ex delicto) abate. See
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957,961 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,

184 P. 477,477 (1919). The question whether a claim survives is closely related to the question
whether it is assignable. As the Court noted in MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254
(1926), "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is by authorities intimately associated with, and
in most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. Thus,
if it survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not." 249 P. at 257.
In determining which causes of action survive the death of an owner, Idaho courts
distinguish between injuries of a personal nature, which do not survive, and injury which lessens
the estate of an injured party, which does survive, and is thus assignable. Id. In the former
category are claims for injury to person, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, libel, slander
and the like. Id. (holding that "an injury suffered through fraud, false representations, or deceit,
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resulting in the diminution of the estate of the injured party, survives and is assignable").
Claims for legal malpractice are not personal injury claims, but rather claims arising out
of contract which seek to recover for economic loss. As this Court has recognized, "[l]egal
malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho
702, 704, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982). While a legal malpractice claim has a tort basis, the
attorney's duty is contractual and the scope of that contractual duty is defined by the purposes for
which the attorney is retained. Jd.; accord, Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521,
248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011) ("A legal malpractice action is based on a combination of tort and
contract theories. The attorney-client relationship is generally based on contract principles,
while the negligence standard is based on tort principles"); cf Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho
322,256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011) (Court has "repeatedly observed that a contract for legal services
can be a 'commercial transaction' as defined in" § 12-120(3)).6
Moreover, compensable damages suffered by a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action are
limited to the pecuniary loss attributable to the defendant's wrongful acts. O'Neil v. Vasseur,
796 P.2d 134, 140 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); see also, e.g., Hedlund Mfg. Co., 539 A.2d at 359 ("By
contrast [to a claim for damages for personal injury], a claim for damages based upon legal
malpractice does not involve personal injury in that it arises out of negligence and breach of
contract, and the injury alleged concerns purely pecuniary interests. The rights involved are
more akin to property rights which can be assigned prior to liquidation"); Oppel v. Empire Mut.

6 Indeed, it is not uncommon in legal malpractice cases for a plaintiff to bring both
negligence and breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz,
Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303, 305 (2000) (attorney malpractice, breach of contract, fraud and
misrepresentation); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002) (professional
negligence, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract).
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Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (cause of action for legal malpractice is
assignable "in that it is based both on breach of implied contract and negligence, and does not
involve personal injuries") (footnote omitted).
For these reasons, a cause of action for legal malpractice, which arises out of an attorneyclient contract, survives the death of the client. See Shelton v. Owens, No. CV -09-3597, 2010
WL 3393364 (Idaho Dist. Ct. July 2010) (holding that cause of action against attorney for legal
malpractice sounded in both tort and contract, and thus the action survived former client's death).
It is therefore also assignable. There is no reason a different rule should apply where, as here,

the claim is asserted by a corporate plaintiff that assigns its claims to a successor corporate
entity.7
Here, St. Luke's claims arise directly out of the attorney-client relationship that was
formed when Farmers hired Luciani to represent Magic Valley in the underlying litigation
(CompI.

<J[<J[

2, 7, 20, 52, 62), and St. Luke's is seeking to recover pecuniary losses proximately

caused by Luciani's legal malpractice, including millions of dollars in payments it or its
predecessor, Magic Valley, were forced to make to successor counsel and to an outside expert,
Coding Compliance, to remedy that malpractice and protect the Hospital against ruinous liability.
Because those claims are assignable "things in action," and arise out of contract, the majority
rule permitting a predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to its successor is
consistent with Idaho law.

7 Effective July 1,2011, Idaho Code § 5-327(2) came into effect, providing for general
survivability of negligence claims: "A cause of action for personal injury or property damage
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured
person from causes not related to the wrongful action or negligence."
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C.

The General Rule In Some Other States Against Assignment Of Legal
Malpractice Claims Should Not Apply To Bar St. Luke's Claims.

As the district court observed, courts in other jurisdictions are split on whether legal
malpractice actions are assignable: some hold assignment to be against public policy, while
other courts allow assignment under certain circumstances. Order at 1. It is true, as Luciani
argued below, that the majority of jurisdictions to have considered the issue articulate a general
rule of non-assignability. See generally Annot., Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 64
A.L.R.6th 473 (2011); Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7:12, at 829-57. 8 However, nearly
all of those cases involved purported assignments to strangers to the attorney-client relationship,
often the client's litigation adversary, rather than to a successor in a commercial transaction, the
context in which the issue is presented here. As a number of courts have pointed out, the public
policy considerations invoked to support that rule do not apply in this context, and therefore do
not mandate "blind adherence to a general rule of prohibition in all cases of assignment."

Cerberus Partners, 728 A.2d at 1060. This Court therefore should reject the general rule of
non-assignability in favor of the specific rule applicable in this context, which permits a
predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to a successor.
The leading case that first articulated a rule against assignment of legal malpractice
actions was Goodley v. Wank and Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Cal. App. 1976). In Goodley,
the plaintiff was the assignee of a claim for legal malpractice against defendant attorneys arising
out of their advice to the wife in a dissolution proceeding. The California Court of Appeal

8 Approximately fifteen jurisdictions apply a general non-assignability rule, while at least
nine allow assignment of legal malpractice claims, at least under certain circumstances: Illinois,
New Mexico, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, District of Columbia,
and Pennsylvania. 64 A.L.R.6th §§ 4, 5, 18.
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affirmed summary judgment for the attorneys on the ground that a claim for legal malpractice is
not assignable as a matter of public policy. The court acknowledged that by statute in California,
choses in action arising out of an obligation or breach of contract are generally assignable, and
that "the relationship between plaintiff's assignor and defendants arose out of a contract for legal
services." 133 Cal. Rptr. at 84-86. However, it concluded that the legal malpractice claim
nevertheless was not assignable, basing its holding on "the uniquely personal nature of legal
services and the contract out of which a highly personal and confidential attorney-client
relationship arises, and public policy considerations based thereon." !d. at 86. The court
elaborated on those concerns as follows:
The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice
action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be
exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had
a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the
attorney never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any
prior connection with the assignor or his rights. The commercial
aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out of legal
malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the
legal profession. The almost certain end result of merchandizing
such causes of action is the lucrative business of factoring
malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits
against members of the legal profession, promote champerty and
force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers. The
endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such
commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the
legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system,
restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the
attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly
confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney
and client.
Ie!. at 87; see also, e.g., Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 183-84 (Or. App. 2001) (summarizing

the concerns cited by those courts that hold that legal malpractice claims may never be assigned).
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The Goodley mle of non-assignability has been the subject of considerable scholarly
criticism,9 and has been rejected by a significant number of jurisdictions, including the high
courts of Massachusetts and Maine. Cerberus Partners, L.P., 728 A.2d at 1060 ("both time and
academic criticism have served to question [Goodley's] general blanket application to all manner
of assignability of legal malpractice claims"); see, e.g., New Hampshire ins. Co., inc. v. McCann,
707 N.E.2d 332,336 (Mass. 1999) ("We are not persuaded that every voluntary assignment of a
legal malpractice claim should be barred as matter of law"); Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co.,
567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989) ("there is no reason to prohibit the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim in a situation such as this"). This Court should decline to impose that general
rule to bar St. Luke's claims against Luciani, for several reasons.

1. This Court Should Not Substitute Its Views Of Public Policy For Those
Of The Idaho Legislature.
At the threshold, this Court should decline to substitute its own views for those of the
Idaho Legislature, which has expressly directed by statute that things in action are assignable,
without carving out any exceptions to that general rule. As this Court recently stated,

9 See, e.g., Note, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A Contractual Solution
to a Contractual Problem, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 483 (2003) (arguing that the policy reasons
given by courts that follow the blanket non-assignability rule are "unpersuasive" and that "legal
malpractice claims should be freely assignable, as is almost every other chose in action"); Quinn,
On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1205 (1996) (arguing
that "the Goodley mle is not sustained by sound legal or public policy reasoning"); Comment,
Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533,
1534-35, 1545 (1992) (concluding that "the interests of consistency and public policy favor
permitting voluntary assignments of legal malpractice claims," and that "few of the arguments
made against the assignment of legal malpractice claims stand up to close scmtiny").
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The legislati ve power is vested in the senate and house of
representatives, not in this Court. As we said in Berry v. Koehler,
84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010,1013 (1962), "The wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the
legislature alone."
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, No. 37574-2010,2011 WL 5375192 (Idaho
Nov. 9,2011), at *5 (citation omitted). For that reason, as the Hawaii Supreme Court recently
observed in ruling that professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud claims are
assignable, even if a court is "not unsympathetic" to the view that public policy should preclude
such assignment, it should defer to the legislature:
However, questions regarding the wisdom of permitting such
assignments are more appropriately directed to the legislature,
which is better positioned to balance the policy considerations and
potential consequences that will flow from such a decision.
TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 444 (Haw. 2007);10 see also lkuno v. Yip, 912
F.2d 306, 313 n.9, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The Washington legislature has not seen fit to limit
the application of the execution statute. Nor shall we.") (reversing dismissal of legal negligence
claim against attorney by non-client investor who bought aU of corporate client's assets at a
sheriff's sale, including "all right, title, and interest of [company], ... in all rights, choses in
action, and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever against any and all persons whomever,
including but not limited to, claims against the following persons: ... [attorney]").

Although a law firm was one of the named defendants in TMJ Hawaii, the court did not
address the specific question whether legal malpractice claims are assignable, which was not
certified to that court. 153 P.3d at 446 n.1. The court's reasoning in that case, however, is
equally applicable to legal malpractice claims.
10
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2.

Nearly All Cases Applying The Rule Of Non-Assignability Involve
Assignments To Strangers, Not To Successors In Interest.

The rule of non-assignability of legal malpractice claims should not apply where, as here,
the assignment in question was to a successor entity in the context of a larger commercial
transaction. The vast majority of reported cases that refuse to allow assignment involve
situations where a party sought to assign legal malpractice claims against its attorneys to a
stranger to the attorney-client relationship, such as the client's litigation adversary. Indeed, some
courts have explicitly limited their holdings to that situation. See, e.g., Gurski v. Rosenblum and

Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 165, 171 (Conn. 2005) (holding that "an assignment of a legal
malpractice claim or the proceeds from such a claim to an adversary in the same litigation that
gave rise to the alleged malpractice is against public policy and therefore unenforceable," but
noting "we are not persuaded that every voluntary assignment of a legal malpractice action
should be barred as a matter of law"); Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash.
2003) (holding that a legal malpractice claim is not "assignable to an adversary in the same
litigation that gave rise to the alleged legal malpractice," but "leaving for another day the broader
issue of whether legal malpractice claims may be assignable in other circumstances"); see also,

e.g., Eden Technologies, LLC v. Kile Goekjian Reed & McManus, PLLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79
(D.D.C. 2009) ("The issue in this case is not whether legal malpractice claims can be assigned,
but rather, whether a company can assign its legal malpractice claim to a former litigation
adversary as a part of the settlement of that litigation").
As the courts have recognized, a commercial transaction in which an entity voluntarily
transfers assets and liabilities to a successor, including claims against third parties, involves
entirely different issues. Highlighting the point, the Eden Technologies court found that the
assignment of a malpractice claim to a litigation adversary would be invalidated as a matter of
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public policy under District of Columbia law, but distinguished Richter on the ground that the
malpractice claim there "was not bartered or sold to an unrelated third party and [the assignor]
and [assignee] were never opponents in litigation during which the alleged malpractice occurred.
It was merely a sale of a corporation's assets." 675 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citation omitted); see also,

e.g., Richter, 940 F. Supp. at 357 ("The courts that have barred the assignment of legal
malpractice claims have relied primarily on factors not present in this case, including the fear
that parties will sell off claims, particularly to opponents or completely unrelated third parties,
and a concern about jeopardizing the personal nature of legal services") (citations omitted);

Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 184 (Or. App. 2001) ("An assignment of a malpractice claim by
one corporation to another as part of a merger or acquisition does not present these concerns").
The blanket rule therefore should not apply here.

3.

None Of The Public Policy Considerations Underlying The General
Rule Applies Here.

Most broadly, the public policy considerations that are said to justify a blanket rule of
non-assignability simply do not apply here, and for that reason the rule itself should not apply.
An examination of each of the factors said to justify the Goodley rule readily establishes that
none applies here. This Court therefore should not adopt that rule to bar St. Luke's claims here.
As the Oregon Court of Appeals recently put it in declining to adopt the rule,
The contrary rule that defendant proposes would bar assignment of
malpractice claims even when the assignee has a bona fide interest
in the claim and when none of the evils that may flow from such an
assignment is present.

Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 184 (Or. App. 2001).
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First, "[t]his case does not raise the specter of open trading of legal malpractice claims,"

or of the creation of a market for such claims. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337;
Thurston, 567 A.2d at 923 ("We are not here confronted with the establishment of a general

market for such claims; this assignee has an intimate connection with the underlying lawsuit").11
To the contrary, the record is undisputed that Magic Valley assigned its claims against third
parties to St. Luke's in the context of a larger transaction in which it transferred substantially all
of its assets and liabilities to a new owner, which continued to operate the same business, with
the same facility, employees and licenses. "Thus, we are not dealing here with a situation where
a legal malpractice claim was transferred to a person without any other rights or obligations
being transferred along with it." Cerberus Partners, 728 A.2d at 1059. For the same reason,
there is no risk of collusion between the assignor and assignee.
Second, Magic Valley's assignment of its legal malpractice claims to St. Luke's does not

pose any threat to the duties of loyalty or confidentiality owed by Luciani. St. Luke's is Magic
Valley's successor, not a litigation adversary or unrelated third party. Accordingly, there is no
risk, as there might be in a case where claims were assigned to a litigation opponent, that "a party
could sue the adverse party's attorney, thereby threatening attorney-client confidentiality."
Gregory, 26 P.3d at 183-84. Nor is there any risk that such a plain-vanilla assignment to a

successor, rather than to a litigation adversary, will "demean public confidence in the legal

II The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has noted its suspicion that "fear of
'open trading' is based in part on outmoded concepts and protectionism," observing that "[tJhere
is nothing to show that, in those jurisdictions that permit the voluntary assignment of a
malpractice claim, there has been an increase in baseless lawsuits." New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337.
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profession." New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337.

Third, that the claims were assigned in the context of a larger commercial transaction that
took place months after Magic Valley terminated its attorney-client relationship with Luciani
likewise eliminates any risk that "assignments would increase the frequency with which legal
malpractice claims are brought, thereby providing a disincentive to supplying legal services to
those who need them." Gregory, 26 P.3d at 183. Nor is there any merit to the concern that "the
increased possibility of assignability may deter attorneys from zealously representing their
interests." Id. "It is farfetched to imagine that a lawyer will be discouraged from zealously
representing a client out of fear that the client may later offer a malpractice action against the
lawyer as a part of the resolution of another case." New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at
336-37. Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence that Magic Valley's assignment of its
claims against Luciani had any effect on Luciani's representation, which was terminated prior to
the St. Luke's Transaction.
In short, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated succinctly in rejecting the blanket
rule,
[T]here is no reason to prohibit the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim in a situation such as this. We are not here
confronted with the establishment of a general market for such
claims; this assignee has an intimate connection with the
underlying lawsuit. Although some cases from other jurisdictions
flatly prohibit the assignment of any legal malpractice claim, their
reasoning is not persuasive. A legal malpractice claim is not for
personal injury, but for economic harm. The argument that legal
services are personal and involve confidential attorney-client
relationships does not justify preventing a client like 3K from
realizing the value of its malpractice claim in what may be the
most efficient way possible, namely, its assignment to someone
else with a clear interest in the claim who also has the time, energy
and resources to bring the suit.
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Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922,923 (Me. 1989).

VII.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should answer the question certified to it by the U.S.

District Court for the District of Idaho as follows:
On the undisputed facts here, which involve "an asset and liability transfer from Magic
Valley to St. Luke's" that included an assignment of "all claims against third parties by the
Hospital," Magic Valley's assignment to St. Luke's of its legal malpractice claims against
Luciani was effective under Idaho law.
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